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Abstract  
In recent years, there has been a noticeable ‘turn’ toward questions of sound’s ontology in 
sound studies. Apropos of this ontological turn, there is self-professed move away from 
questions of culture, signification, discourse, and identity; and toward questions of 
materiality, affect, potentiality, aesthetics, and abstraction. Moreover, the ontological turn 
in sound studies can be understood to mark a move away from the specific to the general. 
Yet, general models are not neutral models. Though they often appear abstract, the 
theoretical and analytical tools through which sound is heard, experienced and understood 
are inextricable from cultural and political histories, economic imperatives, aesthetic 
priorities and gendered and racialized epistemologies.  
 
Taking Christoph Cox’s Cagean sonic philosophy as exemplary, I propose that the turn to 
ontology is sound studies is often predicated on what I refer to as a ‘modest’ white aurality 
– a collective, racialized perceptual schema that is both universalizing and situated. The 
notion of white aurality is further articulated through the comparison on two sound works: 
Lawrence English’s Airport Symphony (2007) which is understood to sonically enact the 
move toward generality; and Chino Amobi’s Airport Music for Black Folk (2016), whose 
abrasive and disruptive soundscapes gesture toward the racialized violence that is 




In this article, I consider how the revived interest in ontology within sonic theory connects 
to questions of race. Symptomatic of a broader ‘turn’ to ontology in critical thought, the 
(re)turn to ontology in sound studies is predicated on an ‘origin myth’ that disavows ‘old’ 
questions of culture, signification, discourse, and identity and promotes ‘new’ questions of 
materiality, affectivity reality and being. This origin myth is re-articulated with the 
introduction of Christoph Cox’s materialist sonic philosophy, which hears the ‘richest’ 
sound art as giving voice to ‘the nature of the sonic’. Building on Nikki Sullivan’s notion 
of white optics, I suggest that Cox’s ontology is predicated upon a ‘modest’ white aurality 
– a racialized perceptual standpoint that is both situated and universalizing.  Just as 
whiteness is not simply an individual trait that is possessed, white aurality is not specific to 
or possessed by Cox; indeed, I suggest that in Cox’s work, white aurality is partly indebted 
to a particular engagement with John Cage: an engagement that amplifies an apparent 
distinction between the social and the ontological in Cage’s work, while muffling its 
political dimensions. The notion of white aurality is further exemplified through the 
comparison on two sound works: Lawrence English’s Airport Symphony (2007) which is 
heard to enact a move toward sonic generality; and Chino Amobi’s Airport Music for Black 
Folk (2016), which, apropos of Fred Moten’s notion of blackness as paraontological 
disruption, is heard as sounding the racialized violence of objecthood that often goes 
unheard by sonic philosophy’s white aurality. 
 
The racial politics of ontology 
The transdisciplinary return to ontology and the concomitant return to realism and 
materialism has been widely celebrated and contested. For its advocates, the ontological 
turn marks a radical and much-needed reinvigoration of philosophy and critical scholarship 
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that boldly takes aim the ‘great outdoors’ of thought; for its critics, the ontological turn is a 
politically suspect, retrograde move that, in its pursuit of objects and matter, tunes out key 
questions concerning the social, economics and history.1  
The return to ontology is primarily associated with three theoretical ‘movements’ or 
‘schools’: speculative realism, object-oriented ontology, and new materialism. Though 
there are important divergences between these ‘schools’, there are also some common 
thematics that run throughout: for example, the decentering of ‘the human’, the social 
subject and a renunciation of anthropocentrism; a focus on the pre-, extra- or non-social 
‘real’ and/or ‘material’ world; the utilisation of ‘scientistic’ approaches; and an interest 
emergence, speculation, potentiality, the ‘general’ and the ‘universal’. These theoretical 
commitments are frequently posited as antithetical to the dominant paradigms of twentieth-
century continental thought: namely, social constructivism, linguistics, structuralism, 
poststructuralism, deconstruction and psychoanalysis. The disavowal of these 
‘correlationist’ and ‘anthropocentric’ approaches functions as an origin myth. Against the 
‘staleness’ of social theory, discourses of signification and representation, textual analysis 
and cultural critique, the ontological turn, in its abolition of the Kantian shadow over 
philosophy, promises a vibrant new line of flight. Nick Srnicek clearly exemplifies this 
tendency in his description of speculative realism:  
  
Do we really need another analysis of how a cultural representation does 
symbolic violence to a marginal group? This is not to say that this work has 
been useless, just that it’s become repetitive…Speculative realism provides 
the best means for creative work to be done, and it provides genuine 
excitement to think that there are new argumentative realms to explore.2  
 
The ‘repetitive’ focus on the symbolic violence committed against marginal groups, is 
countered by the ‘excitement’ of the speculative turn to the ontological, the real and the 
material. In turning his attention to ‘properly ontological questions’, the philosopher refuses 
to partake in the reduction of his field to ‘an analysis of texts or of the structure of 
consciousness.’3 This new vanguard rises from the ashes of philosophy’s worn out 
paradigms, generating a much needed reinvigoration of critical discourse.   
The formation of the ontological turn’s origin myth prompts important questions 
about the political commitments and motivations of these ‘exciting’ and ‘creative’ projects. 
Indeed, many of the marginal groups implied by Srnicek’s dismissal have good reason to be 
suspicious of a reinvigorated interest in ontology, given the historical complicity of 
metaphysics in erasing and justifying violence against marginalized social groups. Sylvia 
Wynter, for example, has shown how secular ontological accounts of the human emerge 
with colonial conquest; and how being, subsequently, is equated with the overrepresented 
ethnoclass of western, bourgeois man, resulting in the obfuscation of other modes and 
possibilities of being.4 The conflation Wynter identifies, which sees Enlightenment notions 
of humanity spoken about ‘as if it were the human itself’5, is risked when ‘the human’ is 
spoken about in the singular, including when ‘the human’ is something to be overcome, 
decentred or disposed of: a departure from the subject, of anthropocentrism and of 
white,,Eurocentric humanism is by no means a departure from whiteness.6  Likewise, in 
‘The Fact of Blackness’ Frantz Fanon articulates the underlying and unspoken whiteness of 
the ontological and its entanglement with the ‘historico-racial schema’: ‘ontology….does 
not permit us to understand the being of the black man…The black man has no ontological 
resistance in the eyes of the white man.’7 For Fanon, the colonial history of race and of 
racialization inhibits blackness from inclusion in the white-defined realm of being. Instead, 
blackness and its subjects are banished to a field of non-being. The ontological, meanwhile 
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is ‘naturalized’ as universal ground, obscuring the realm of non-being upon which it is 
predicated. Thus where the ontological has come to signify ‘a realm of apparent liberation 
from the miasmas of the social world’ in much realist and new materialist thought, Fanon 
regards ontology itself as ‘a mystifying form of appearance that posits itself as outside of 
social inscriptions of race, when in fact this very positing is integral to the dialectics of 
racialization itself.’8 Fred Moten, building on but also in contradistinction to Fanon, asserts 
that blackness should not be reduced to its absence, its ontological impossibility, for ‘what 
is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies’.9 For Moten, Fanon leaves 
unclaimed is an ‘irremediable homelessness common to the colonized, the enslaved and the 
enclosed.’10 Blackness, as that which operates ‘at the nexus of the social and the 
ontological, the historical and the essential’, demands a paraontology of disorder. 11 
Blackness is paraontological in that lived experiences of blackness both enact and escape 
the assignment of blackness to social death, of non-being. This straining of blackness 
against itself disrupts and resists the ontological: it is; it is escaped and is what escapes.  
In light of Wynter’s, Fanon’s and Moten’s remarks, it is significant that these 
racialized erasures and exclusions from the realm of ontology have been echoed in the 
historicizing of recent ontological thought: with the shift from ontologies of presence to 
‘withdrawal’, transcendence to immanence, and, in some instances, subject to object, there 
remains little acknowledgement of questions of racialized (non)being that have been raised 
within critical race studies and beyond. 12 Indeed, the rush to position ‘new’ realist and 
materialist trends as a theoretical vanguard has resulted in the sidelining of significant 
antecedents: the materialisms, non-anthropocentrism and more-than-human actors of 
indigenous cosmologies13; the ‘inhumanisms’ and alternative humanisms of decolonial and 
black scholarship (including Wynter’s work)14; and the speculative tendencies of various 
feminisms.15 The erasures of these bodies of work in the ontological turn’s origin myths 
have led Métis scholar Zoe Todd to assert that ‘ontology is just another word for 
colonialism’.16  
These critical antecedents suggest the concerns of the ontological turn do not simply 
preclude a consideration of race. Nonetheless, the failure to acknowledge these critical 
antecedents has been coupled with a notable present-absence of issues of whiteness, 
racialization and coloniality in recent scholarship addressing ‘properly ontological 
questions’. This present-absence of race might be considered symptomatic of attempts to 
scission the ontological (and, by proxy, the real; matter/materiality) from the realm of 
politics and social life (and death).17 If the ontological turn appears to try and move 
‘beyond’ the social, then it might be inferred from the realist/new materialist quietude that 
race and racialization are too social, too discursive and too ‘human’ to merit attention 
within these extra- non- and post- human/social paradigms. As Diana Leong notes apropos 
of new materialism, race is often crudely reduced to ‘identity politics’, or sidestepped in the 
rush to endorse paradigms of difference-without-race.18 Yet race is not only a socio-
discursive fiction: as Sara Ahmed has shown in her phenomenological discussion of 
whiteness, processes of racialization are real, lived and material.19 In Ahmed’s account, 
whiteness is something that does, that reifies and orientates: it is a protocol that produces 
and orders spatial-temporal relations, and enhances and limits a body’s affective capacities 
in relation to its surroundings. Thus racialization is not simply of ‘the social’ and ‘the 
human’, but that through which ‘the human’ and ‘the social’ is (re)produced.  
The ontological turn’s to reach the pre-, non- or extra- social, moreover, has some 
troubling resonances with retrograde socio-political tendencies. As Jordana Rosenberg 
argues, the ontological turn’s marked interest in the ‘ancestral realm’ – a pre-conscious 
terra nullius, unmediated by social order – calls to mind a number of New-World 
‘primitivist’ fantasies that are familiar to scholars of colonialism and settler-colonialims. 
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While Rosenberg warns against crudely framing recent ontological scholarship as a 
colonialist project, there remains a need to ask ‘why the lust for dehistoricization, for 
demediation, for temporality outside of history’ is currently flourishing and what is the 
‘cost’ of this apparent autonomization: ‘matter may appear to free itself from the subject 
and drive toward unpredictable aleatory newness, but we celebrate this only at the cost of 
participating in the “attack” on the social’ that characterizes the current political moment.20 
Similarly, Mel Chen has suggested apropos of the recent theoretical drive toward the 
experimental, potentiality and the ‘strange’, the desire of whiteness to ‘go cosmic’ is a 
recurring thematic of capitalism and empire. In light of this, Chen asks to what extent new 
materialist and realist scholarship can be considered new technologies engaged in 
forgetting, in which lived and embodied differences such as race, class, sex and ability are 
no longer deemed relevant due to fictions of scale.21 Building upon Rosenberg and Chen’s 
observations, it might be asked what are the historical circumstances of this technology of 
forgetting: to what extent does the turn away from lived differences, social mediation and 
historicism and toward being-without-sociality, the object-itself and the pure productivity 
of matter mirror the rhetorical and material formations of ‘post-civil rights’ ‘post-racist’, 
‘post-sexist’, ‘post-class’, ‘post-identity’ capitalist society? Indeed, the critical work of 
Fanon, Wynter and Moten reminds us that ontologies bear the traces of their historical 
moment – even when those ontologies ‘withdraw’ from mediation.22   
 
Sonic philosophy   
The (re)turn to ontology in philosophy and critical theory contra the purportedly 
anthropocentric questions of cultural representation, signification and identity has been 
echoed within sonic discourse. This shift might be articulated apropos of the disjuncture 
between ‘sound studies’ and ‘auditory culture’, as the terms have been defined by Brian 
Kane. While the terms are often used interchangeably, Kane suggests that ‘sound studies’, 
conceptualised as a particular body of scholarship interested in addressing the ontology of 
sound via Deleuzian metaphysics, can be understood to position itself as autonomous from 
the priorities and methodologies of ‘auditory culture’. Where the latter disciplinary label 
typically pertains to ‘cultural’ research, such as the development of auditory techniques, 
histories of media technologies and the emergence and maintenance of sonic communities, 
the former joins the broader ontological turn in seeking to break away from culturally-
oriented questions of representation, signification and subjective experience. As Kane 
asserts, in this context, ‘representation’ and ‘signification’ ‘stand in for a variety of 
hermeneutic and interpretive commitments, like those of cultural studies, phenomenology, 
historicism and deconstruction, to name a few.’23 The problematics of an ontologically-
oriented sound studies, broadly conceptualised, are imagined to radically depart from those 
which animate the theoretical modes lumped together under the rubric of ‘signification and 
representation’ or ‘the linguistic turn’.   
The separation of auditory culture and sound studies thus marks a distinction 
between ‘narrowband’ and ‘broadband’ interests: where the former prioritises situated 
knowledges, practices and histories; the latter is interested in the foundational, the abstract 
and the general. Symptomatic of these ‘broadband’ interests is the prevailing interest in 
noise, conceptualised via Deleuzian notions of the virtual; and a concomitant aesthetic 
prioritisation of sound art practices that are considered to turn their ear to the materiality of 
sound. Where music is thought to obscure material being of sound by virtue of its cultural, 
representational and meaningful content; experimental music and sound art is understood to 
interrogate the affective, non-representational and non-discursive dimensions of the sonic. 
As a result, ‘materialist’ sound art has been credited with exposing the ontological 
specificities of sound-itself. 
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The sonic ontology that is developed by Christoph Cox over a series of essays is 
exemplary of these critical tendencies. Cox calls for the development of alternative 
materialist and realist approaches to sound art, insofar as sound art is resistant to the 
dominant paradigms of musicology and art history:  ’prevailing theoretical models are 
inadequate to it [sound art]. Developed to account for the textual and the visual, they fail to 
capture the nature of the sonic.’24 It is ‘the nature of the sonic’ with which sound art is 
understood to preoccupy itself. However, for Cox, the response to this myopia should not 
be to think about sound but to ‘think sonically’; to allow sound to generate its own forms of 
thought.  
While Cox’s ambition elevate sound on a par with philosophy is both admirable and 
provocative, his pursuit of the ‘nature of sound’ risks uncritically naturalizing what is 
ultimately a specific onto-epistemology of sound that is entangled with, amongst other 
things, histories of whiteness and coloniality.25 Indeed, Cox’s argument appears to be 
caught between the development of a specific ontological approach appropriate for (and 
therefore contingent upon) what he considers to be the aesthetic priorities of post-Cagean 
sound art (i.e. a materialist ontology of sound art); and the much grander accreditation of 
sound art as revealing ‘the nature’ of sound-itself as it exists ‘beyond’ the realm of 
representation, signification and culture.  
Cox asserts that sonic ontology is ‘strange’ insofar as it radically unsettles our 
ordinary ways of speaking, sensing and conceiving.  This ‘strangeness’ is illustrated by 
contrasting a normative, ‘everyday ontology’ of objects, that privileges sight and touch, 
with an immersive sonic ontology of flow and flux. Where an ontology predicated on 
vision relies upon the distance between perceiver and perceived, subject and object, the 
sonic is presented as immersive and engulfing: “lacking earlids, we are forever and 
inescapably bathed in sound, immersed in it in a way that we are not immersed in a world 
of visible objects. An attention to sound, then, will provoke us to modify our everyday 
ontology and our common sense conception of matter.’26 For Cox, sound is a virtual, 
material and temporal flow that is actualised in human activities such as music and speech 
but also exceeds them.  The ‘richest’ works of sound art – such as Cage’s 4’33”, Alvin 
Lucier’s I am Sitting in a Room, Max Neuhaus’s Times Square, and Christina Kubisch’s 
Electrical Walks – Cox’s hears as turning their attention to this virtual dimension of the 
sound and consequently reveal their ontological basis, ‘disclosing a genuine metaphysics of 
sound’.27  
Despite his assertions of the mind-independence (and by extension, hearing-
independence) of sound, the contrast between an ‘everyday’ and sonic ontology resonates 
with what Jonathan Sterne has referred to as the audiovisual litany: a series of  ‘rhetorically 
powerful but not very accurate’ axioms that account for the relationship between hearing 
and vision.28 Indebted to the spiritualism and the ascendancy of the white Christian West, 
the audiovisual litany is organised around a series of dualisms that treat visual and sonic 
experience as unchanging and transhistorical givens. According to the audiovisual litany, 
vision tends toward separation, spatiality and perspective; whereas hearing pertains to 
immersion, immanence, contact and temporality. Cox’s response to philosophical 
ocularcentrism – philosophy’s historic reliance and emphasis on the eye – is to invert the 
audio-visual litany, substituting the distance of the visual with the immersiveness of the 
sonic.  
The resonance between Cox’s sonic philosophy and the audiovisual litany suggests 
that while it is presented as a general model, the notion of sound-as-flux is by no means 
neutral. Rather, as Cox himself makes clear, it is indebted to a particular European 
philosophical lineage (Leibniz, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Deleuze), coupled with a 
Eurological and patrilineal ‘dotted line’ of sonic experimentation that stems from the 
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‘greatest forefather’ [sic.] of sound art, John Cage. 29  The centrality of (a particular reading 
of) Cage to Cox’s sonic philosophy is perhaps unsurprising, given the striking resonances 
between many of the former’s aesthetic and philosophical priorities and those of the 
contemporary ontological turn: for example, Cage’s work is marked by notions of a real, 
universal and immanent nature, the prioritization of materiality as distinct from sociality 
and culture, as well as the evident Cagean desire to ‘go cosmic’ through panaurality and the 
sonification of all objects30. Cox seemingly inherits a number of Cage’s ideas – notably, the 
Cagean ambition to ‘let sounds be themselves’ and, correspondingly, the bifurcations of 
sonic materiality and social signification, nature and culture; as well as the desire for a shift 
from egocentric composer to ‘modest’ curator of sonic flux. This distinction of composer 
and curator underlines Cox’s dualism of music (which stands in for signification, culture, 
meaning, discourse) and sound art (which stands in for ontology, materiality, sound-itself, 
flux).   
To describe the Cagean curator as modest invokes to the term’s Harawayian 
usage.31 Modest is the modernist virtue of scientistic and traceless observation; entangled 
with formations of whiteness, masculinity and eurocentrism, it pertains to a subjectless 
position from which the world is observed from everywhere and nowhere, and from which 
bias is ‘removed’ through obfuscation. As Ben Piekut argues, while it has often been 
attributed to his borrowings from ‘Asian’ philosophy, the Cagean ambition of self-
abnegation, ‘reproduces an all-too-familiar dynamics of power in the West’: Cage 
recapitulates the self-invisibilization of the white, masculinist and Eurocentric standpoint, 
enabling himself to become the auditory observer of sound’s nature.32  
 The racialized dynamics of Cage’s self-abnegation are reiterated apropos of Cage’s 
criticisms of jazz. In his essay on Afrological and Eurological improvisation, George Lewis 
describes how whiteness enables Cage to become an objective arbiter of aesthetic value, 
and subsequently deem Afrological improvisation in need of improvement by becoming 
more ‘free’ in accordance with Eurological musical values. Importantly, Cage criticises 
jazz for its maintenance of personality; Lewis cites the composer’s remarks that ‘the form 
of jazz suggests too frequently that people are talking – that is, in succession – like in a 
panel discussion….if I am going to listen to speech then I would like to hear some words.’33 
In other words, to Cage’s ears, jazz fails to sufficiently abandon the self.  Here, there are 
traceable echoes of Cox’s aforementioned comments about the ‘richest’ sound art: it can be 
inferred from these remarks and (the selective interpretations of) his artistic examples that 
the richest sound art does not tell stories but is avowedly depersonalised in its disclosure of 
the materiality and ontology of sound.  
As Lewis makes clear, Cage’s aesthetic sensibilities are racialized, though rarely 
acknowledged as such. Yet the Cagean distinction between sonic materiality and sociality 
that Piekut identifies and Cox repeats is complicated by its relationship to the political. 
Cage’s aesthetic philosophy is by no means ‘asocial’, inasmuch as it is explicitly indebted 
to what he identified as an anarchistic politics, which prioritized non-hierarchy, the 
dissolution of power-over, and a particular conception of ‘freedom’.34 The Cagean call to 
‘let sounds be themselves’ was expressive of a (by no means unproblematic) politics that 
sought to relinquish control. However, Cox’s reading of Cage is necessarily selective – it 
separates Cagean aesthetic philosophy from its political underpinning. In doing so, Cox can 
be understood to amplify the latent ‘modesty’ of Cage, so as to maintain a distinction 
between sonic materiality and sociality.  
To highlight the ‘situatedness’ of Cox’s ontology and the metaphor of flux is not to 
demand its dismissal so much as to recognise its partiality. Yet in spite of Cox’s own 
historicism, the sonic flux exposed (or, more accurately, generated) by Eurological sound 
art and philosophy is not presented as a specific ontological figuration, borne out of a 
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particular historical, geographic, social, aesthetic, epistemological and technological milieu. 
Rather, to borrow from Wynter, it might be said that Cox risks speaking of this particular 
conceptualisation of the sonic-as-flux as if it were ‘sound-(in)-itself’. Moreover, the 
bifurcation of materiality and meaning, sonic nature and culture in the path towards a 
‘genuine metaphysics’ obscures the co-constitution of ‘sonic ontology’ and ‘the social’ (if, 
indeed, these categories can be clearly distinguished from one another). Although Cox 
suggests that ‘if we proceed from sound, we would be less inclined…to draw distinctions 
between culture and nature, human and nonhuman, mind and matter, the symbolic and the 
real, the textual and the physical’,35 these dualisms are re-produced by Cox’s origin story: 
as with many of the proponents of the ontological turn, Cox’s materialist ontology is 
predicated on the disavowal of insufficiently materialist/ontological approaches (i.e. 
textual, representational, discursive, sociological), resulting in the reestablishment of the 
oppositional categories that these ‘outdated’ approaches are criticised for failing to 
overcome.    
 
White aurality  
Just as the critical gaze of new materialisms and speculative realisms have been understood 
to co-produced with, through and alongside what Nikki Sullivan has referred to a ‘white 
optics’, Cox’s sonic ontology (and indeed, Cage’s) can be understood to be situated through 
and within a ‘white aurality’. Sullivan’s white optics pertains to a racialized yet naturalized 
perceptual schema that makes matter ‘matter’ by virtue of its opposition to ‘culture’. 
Metonymically associated with ‘physical processes’, ‘the non-human’, ‘the physiological’ 
and ‘the animal’, matter is produced with and through this perceptual schema as both ‘more 
than human’ and ‘other than cultural.’36  White optics are ‘modest’ insofar as it involves 
seeing from everywhere and nowhere, having liberated itself of (which is to say, obscured 
its indebtedness to) perspective. However, though it often appears as such, perception is not 
considered a neutral process of mediation; nor something that a perceiving subject 
processes. Rather, perception is shared, social and co-constitutive process that shapes and is 
shaped by knower and known, perceiver and perceived. It is an effect and vehicle of 
sedimented contextual knowledges, which ‘constitutes that which it presumes to merely 
apprehend.’37 In this regard, it is akin to Ahmed’s notion of whiteness as material, lived and 
real orientation: white optics is that through which and with which the world unfolds. One 
does not have perspective but is in and (re)produced through perspective.  
Drawing upon Sullivan’s notion of white optics, white aurality can be understood as 
not just relying upon but actively producing a series of bifurcations in its ‘hearing-with’: it 
amplifies the materiality of ‘sound itself’ while muffling its sociality; amplifies Eurological 
sound art and, in the process, muffles other sonic practices; amplifies dualisms of 
nature/culture, matter/meaning, real/representation sound art/music and muffles boundary 
work; all the while invizibilizing its own constitutive presence in hearing the ontological 
conditions of sound-itself. White aurality is not an ahistorical, unchanging perceptual 
schema, insofar as whiteness and aurality are both material-discursive composites that 
shape and are shaped by one another and in relation to a particular environment; but nor is 
it simply the product of individual bias. Rather, recalling Sullivan’s description of 
perception as shared and occupied rather than possessed, white aurality can be understood 
as co-constitutive with, amongst other things, Eurological histories, practices, ontologies, 
epistemologies and technologies of sound, music and audition. 
In arguing that Cox’s sonic ontology is reliant on perspective, I am not seeking to 
affirm that there can be no sound without listening subject, nor am I seeking to deny that 
sound has something to do with materiality and matter – quite the contrary. Rather, what I 
wish to foreground is the role of white aurality in constituting a sonic materiality that can 
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be cleanly distinguished as preceding sociality, discourse, meaning, power; and its role in 
consequently defining the virtues of ‘modest’ sound art. As with whiteness more generally, 
the presence of white aurality is marked by its absence: indeed, the reliance on situated and 
racialized aurality is obscured by an implicit slippage between ‘is’ and ‘heard as’ – sound 
art is revealing of sound’s ontological specificities versus sound art is heard as revealing 
sound’s ontological specificities. This slippage between is and heard as is symptomatic of 
what Kane has identified as a ‘category mistake’, through which exemplification and 
embodiment are conflated. Kane, citing Nelson Goodman, describes exemplification as a 
form of reference where an entity symbolizes properties of its own kind; while embodiment 
means that an entity is of a certain kind. Where the former comes in degrees (an entity may 
be better or worse than an another entity at exemplifying properties), the latter does not: an 
entity either is or is not. And where the former is a mode of reference; the latter is a 
condition. Kane further demonstrates this distinction referring to Cox’s treatment of sound 
art: ‘A work of sound art may sound more sonic (that is, may draw your attention to its 
‘sonicity’ more) than another; but no work of sound art is more sonic than another.’38 The 
sound art that Cox privileges as revealing the ontological condition of sound itself does so 
through exemplification – through a perceived likeness to what is thought to be the work’s 
ontological condition. Thus background noise, de-personalized fuzz and abstract hums 
become sonic metaphors for virtual flux and flow. And yet, as Kane asserts, ‘there is no 
purely logical reason why the movement of attention from figure to ground should be ‘like’ 
the movement from the actual to the virtual. If this analogy makes sense, it is not because 
of any metaphysical or ontological truth but because of shared cultural practices and shared 
conceptual schemas.’39 If no sound work is, by definition, no more or less ontological than 
any other – if this is no firm basis for a meritocracy – then this raises the question as to how 
the ‘richest’ works of sound art come to be exemplary. Indeed, it is surely not coincidental 
that Cox draws heavily from an already well-established, predominantly white and 
masculinist canon of experimental music and sound art (e.g. John Cage, Alvin Lucier, 
Pierre Schaeffer, Francisco López) whose formation has been heavily influenced by 
Cagean aesthetics and principles.   
If white aurality pertains to the present-absence of a universalizing yet situated 
orientation that, in modestly ‘hearing-with’, amplifies certain things and muffles others, 
then this leaves open the possibility of hearing otherwise. However, as Sullivan warns 
apropos of white optics, perspective cannot simply be thrown off by going ‘beyond’ 
culture; nor simply replaced with another at will. It might be, however, that amplifying the 
present-absence of white aurality allows other possible perceptual schema to come to the 
fore.     
 
 Hearing Airports  
The sounds, sites and affects of aviation have been a frequent source of intrigue for artists. 
Airports and air travel have been heard as symbols of the human condition within a 
globalised modernity; a ubiquitous component of everyday life that combines the banal 
with the extraordinary and traverses distinctions of work-time and leisure-time, anxiety and 
excitement, militarism and entertainment, ‘home’ and ‘away’, the ‘same’ and the ‘new’. 
Air travel is also an emblem of noise pollution and environmental damage. Indeed, art has 
been instrumentalized in reducing aviation noise – Paul De Kort’s ‘soundproofing’ land art 
around Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport, for example, has been credited with minimizing 
ambient aircraft noise. Artists have also aimed to encourage listeners to hear the noise of air 
travel differently, as is the case with Lawrence English’s Airport Symphony (2007). 
A homage to Brian Eno’s ambient collection Music for Airports (1978), Airport 
Symphony is a series of sound works by eighteen artists that provide ‘a personal meditation 
	   9	  
on aspects of travel in the modern age and suggests ways in which we control, augment and 
ultimately exists in a time where almost no part of the face of the plant is inaccessible.’40 
Commissioned by the Queensland Music Festival and Brisbane Airport Corporation, each 
track is based around field recordings that were made by English in and around Brisbane 
airport between March and June 2007.  Brisbane Airport Corporation said they hoped the 
work would put ‘romance, poetry and even musicality’ back into travel: ‘We like the mix 
of the mundane and the artistic. Airports don’t normally hold a strong affection in people’s 
hearts, so anything that tries to break down the clichés of the airport as a soulless, 
windswept, barren, unfriendly place, we’re keen to support.’41 English sought to counter the 
negative connotations of aviation noise and airport soundscapes by providing an 
opportunity to hear otherwise. In a newspaper report on the piece, English claims he is 
unable to understand why people complain about aeroplane noise: ‘Living under the flight 
path is like having the best seat in the theatre.’42 
While English refers to the compositions of Airport Symphony as personal 
meditations, such a description exists in tension with the depersonalised aesthetic that 
underlines the compilation. Indeed, despite the variety of artists featured – contributors 
include Christian Fennesz, Fransico López, Jason Kahn, Tim Hecker, Camilla Hannan, 
Toshiya Tsunoda and David Grubbs – the compilation is somewhat homogenous in terms 
of style: slowly evolving drones, abstract hums, gentle rumbles and soaring engine noise 
are in abundance. ‘Human’ voices infrequently feature and are often distant and distorted 
when they do – Christopher Willett’s ‘Plane’ is the notable exception, which centres on the 
tannoyed voice of the flight attendant and the sounds of passengers before descending into 
rapidly panned noise. Likewise, the soundscapes of Airport Symphony for the most part 
remain ‘locationless’: there is very little that marks these sounds as being of Brisbane 
Airport, beyond the accompanying liner notes. Rather, these nominally site-specific sounds 
– of lounges, runways, shops – could be taken from any airport.  As Will Schrimshaw 
suggests, the sonic materials that form the basis of these pieces are utterly generic, they 
evoke the ‘transitory boredom, aesthetic banality and idle consumerism often associated 
with airport architecture and air travel’. Yet ‘through various processes of phonographic 
abstraction sonic matters are mobilized against this banality in the composition of 
something beautiful and singular, if unspecific.’ 43 As with Willett’s ‘Plane’, many of the 
pieces of Airport Symphony audibly moves between the recognisable and the 
unrecognisable, ‘figure’ and ‘ground’, narrowband ‘signal’ and broadband ‘noise’, the 
‘banality’ of the generic and the ‘beauty’ of the general.   
The noisy, abstract and depersonalised soundscapes of Airport Symphony have 
much in common with Cox’s ontologically-oriented sound art, through which abstract 
noise, hums and drones are associated with a worldy sonic flux. The movement between 
‘figure’ and ‘ground’, ‘signal’ and ‘noise’ might be understood as an aural re-presentation 
of the oscillation between ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’, insofar as the latter is framed as ‘the noisy 
substrate of significant sound’. 44In other words, apropos of Cox’s sonic philosophy, 
Airport Symphony might be understood to turn the ear toward the virtual dimension of 
sound.  
This potential interpretation of Airport Symphony, however, fails to account for the 
ways in which the shift between the generic and the general is racialized. For many living 
in a post- 9/11 world, airports are not just sites of banal indifference; rather they are heavily 
securitized and often hostile spaces of racialization, surveillance and borders. Indeed, it is 
no accident that Sara Ahmed’s discussion of whiteness-as-orientation gives the example of 
the airport as a site of immobility, blockage and discomfort:45 Where some bodies that 
‘pass’ are able to flow through and with space, bodies that are deemed ‘out of place’ are 
slowed down, becoming sites of suspicion and stress. Not all bodies that flow are ‘white’ 
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but these bodies nonetheless are able to blend in to the ‘background noise’ of whiteness, 
passing through the site of the airport as unremarkable. Others, meanwhile, emerge as 
suspicious ‘signals’. If the affective experiences of airports is contingent upon bodies 
blending in with or standing out from the background noise of whiteness, then this suggests 
that to hear the airport only as bland, boring, unremarkable and so on is predicated upon a 
white aurality, the presence of which is obscured by the repeated (aural, aesthetic and 
discursive) figuration of airports as generic spaces of banality and blandness, boredom and 
consumerism.  
In Chino Amobi’s Airport Music for Black Folk, other, alternative racialized 
experiences of airports are gestured towards, amplifying that which remains imperceptible 
to white aurality in the process. Released via NON records – a collective or African artists 
and of the diaspora ‘using sound as their primary media to articulate the visible and 
invisible structures that create binaries in society, and in turn distribute power’ – the project 
consists of 7 tracks that Amobi created while travelling in Europe. Amobi states that when 
creating the collection he was ‘interested in the idea of the airport as an international space 
yet a totally Eurocentric and Western manicured experience. I was thinking a lot about 
what a black experience is in that space, how it feels to walk through the airport with 
confidence and not feel like Western culture has superiority over you.’ 46  
Though Amobi’s sonic collages do not use field recordings, there are nonetheless 
some stylistic commonalities with English’s Airport Symphony insofar as noise and 
electronic hums feature heavily in both works. And, as with Airport Symphony, Airport 
Music for Black Folk references Eno’s Music for Airports. However, while the former 
maintains its ambient aesthetic, the latter subverts it with a series of abrasive, disorienting 
and disruptive soundscapes. In the opening track, ‘London’, robotic announcements, 
electronic hums, squalls and clicks, abrasive buzzers and fading sirens accompany an eerie 
spoken word recital by artist Evan Ifekoya. ‘Milan’ transforms the ethereal vocals of Eno’s 
Airport Music into something altogether more unnerving, with gasps and tics accompany a 
repetitive vocoder line. The following track, ‘Warszawa’, however, is much more acerbic, 
consisting of harsh, waspish synths and distorted drumbeats.      
 If Airport Symphony can be heard as noisily evoking a Deleuzian ontology of flow and 
flux, Airport Music for Black Folk might be heard as noisily evoking Fred Moten’s 
aformentioned paraontology of disorder. For Moten, this paraontology is and is demanded 
by blackness; and is reducible to neither ‘simple interdiction nor bare transgression.’47 It is 
significant that for Moten, the phonic is central to opening up space, which, by making 
perceptible the ‘escape’ – the paraontological fugitivity –  of black social life, call into 
question the illusions of whiteness as ontological ground. 48Apropos of Moten, Airport 
Music for Black Folk might be understood to claim blackness-as-fugivity: instead of flow 
and flux, it can be heard to pursue turbulence, or what Moten describes as ‘troubled air’.49 
Moten’s troubled air is what escapes when blackness (as object, as commodity, as non-
being) is both enforced and refused, arising through the vibration of the object against its 
frame. The troubled air of the black object that resists its existence as such might be a 
screech or a scream; ‘an irruption of phonic substance’ from that which is not meant to 
speak.50  With this in mind, Airport Music for Black Folk can be heard to make audible the 
strain of blackness against itself: it sounds the violent securitisation and surveillance of 
black bodies-as-objects; but refuses this by giving voice to – and thus rupturing – 
blackness-as-objecthood and the object/subject distinction. Where Airport Symphony 
morphs the banality of the generic into the beauty of the general, Airport Music for Black 
Folk claims the troubled air of blackness straining against itself and, with this, makes 
audible, through sound’s affective resonances and sonic ‘ugliness’, the general, racialized 
violence that is excluded by and ordinarily imperceptible to white aurality. 51 Consequently, 
	   11	  
the ‘troubled air’ of  Airport  Music for Black Folk works to denaturalize and situate 
whiteness as a perceptual schema, stripping it of its ‘modesty’,  
 
 
Conclusion: situating the ontological  
In this article, I have raised questions as to the racialized dynamics of the recent 
‘ontological turn’ as it is manifest in sound studies. While the presence of race has been 
marked by its absence in contemporary ontological scholarship, this should not be mistaken 
for a post-racialism, insofar as it is whiteness that often enables the orientation of the 
critical gaze elsewhere. I have suggested that recent figurations of the ontological in sound 
studies are co-constituted with a ‘modest’ white aurality. This works to distinguish and 
amplify what is heard as ‘sound-itself’ (which is metonymically associated with ‘abstract’ 
noise, hums and drones), while muffling sound’s relationship to the social world; and holds 
apart sound art’s abstract materiality from lived sociality. White aurality names a racialized 
perceptual schema that is at once situated and ‘modest’ insofar as its own, active presence 
is obscured.  However, in highlighting the entanglement of whiteness with ontology is not 
to argue for the dismissal of ontology per se. Rather, following Moten and Rosenberg, I 
want to suggest that ontology requires resituating amongst its co-productive relations with 
the social world – with culture, materialism, history, politics, science, technology, 
epistemology, aesthetics, experience and perception. Situating rather than simply 
dismissing sonic ontologies enables us to ask how ‘the nature of the sonic’ is determined – 
what grounds the sonic ground  – while remaining open to how it might be heard otherwise.   
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